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MARKET POWER AND AMERICAN 
EXPRESS 
John B. Kirkwood* 
The Second Circuit ruled that American Express did not have 
market power because it operated in a two-sided market and any 
leverage it exercised over merchants derived from its successful 
competition for cardholders. As a result, the relevant market had 
to include both sides of a credit card transaction, the company’s 
market share was modest, and it could not exploit both merchants 
and cardholders. In Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement 
(forthcoming in B.U. L. REV.), I propose a new approach that 
infers market power from the likely effects of the challenged 
conduct. This approach shows that American Express clearly 
exercised market power. Its conduct prevented merchants from 
steering customers to cheaper credit cards and thus maintained 
merchant fees above the competitive level. I also explain why these 
high fees were not justified by the rewards programs the company 
provided to its cardholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal government and seventeen states sued American Express 
(“Amex”) because it insisted on inserting anti–steering provisions in its 
contracts with merchants.1 These provisions prohibited merchants from 
inducing a consumer with an Amex credit card to use another credit card 
with a lower merchant fee.2 The antitrust concern with these provisions 
was obvious: they removed the incentive for a competing credit card 
company to cut its merchant fees since a merchant could not steer 
additional business to it if it did so. Amex’s anti–steering provisions, in 
short, were a restraint on price competition. 
In order to challenge such a restraint, the plaintiffs had to show that 
Amex had market power. The anti–steering provisions were vertical 
restraints—embodied in agreements between Amex and its customers 
(merchants), not between Amex and its competitors—and a vertical 
restraint cannot be condemned unless the court can find market power. Put 
differently, vertical restraints must be evaluated under the Rule of 
Reason,3 and the first step of this balancing test requires direct or indirect 
proof of market power.4 The issue appeared complex because the market 
is two–sided (a credit card company deals with merchants on one side and 
cardholders on the other) and the sides are interrelated (Amex’s value to 
merchants depends on its value to cardholders). Under these 
circumstances, market definition—the traditional first step in market 
power determination—is difficult, and the lower courts split.5 
This Article suggests a better way. In Market Power and Antitrust 
Enforcement,6 I propose that courts infer market power (and its larger 
variant, monopoly power) from the likely effects of the challenged 
conduct. Specifically, courts should find market power if the challenged 
conduct is likely to cause prices to increase significantly above the 
prevailing level or to prevent prices from falling significantly to the but–
for level, the level that would exist in the absence of the challenged 
conduct.7 This approach has numerous advantages over the traditional 
                                                                                                         
1 See generally United States v. American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. American 
Express Co. (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 16–1454).  
2 See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 160–67 (describing what Amex calls 
Non–Discrimination Provisions (“NDPs”)).  
3 See id. at 167.  
4 See id. at 168–69 (indicating that a plaintiff can show either that the defendant had 
market power or that the restraint caused actual anticompetitive effects from which market 
power can be inferred).  
5 See infra Part II.  
6 John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2942315.  
7 If the price change is likely to be substantial, the court should find monopoly power.  
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approach, as my earlier article demonstrates. In this Article, I show that it 
also simplifies the determination of Amex’s market power. 
Part I of the Article defines market power and briefly describes the 
traditional ways of proving it. Part I also sets forth my new approach and 
summarizes the reasons why it is preferable to the traditional approach. 
Part II applies this new approach to American Express. It concludes that 
Amex plainly exercised market power by adopting anti–steering 
provisions that allowed it to maintain merchant fees significantly above 
the but–for level. Part III addresses the customary approach to identifying 
market power—defining a relevant market and measuring the defendant’s 
market share—and explains that while it is suggestive of Amex’s market 
power, it cannot resolve the issue. Part IV analyzes Amex’s asserted 
justifications and find them inadequate. Amex argued, in essence, that its 
higher merchant fees funded its generous rewards programs, but absent a 
market failure this non–price benefit cannot excuse a restraint on price 
competition. 
I. MARKET POWER 
While judges and scholars may differ in their readiness to find market 
power, they do not dispute what it is. Market power is the power to 
profitably raise price above the competitive level. This definition appears 
in the classic articles,8 the leading economics textbook on industrial 
organization,9 and the vast majority of the cases that define market 
power.10 But despite its widespread acceptance, this definition is 
incomplete: it does not specify the competitive level. That is a serious 
problem since one cannot rigorously say that a firm has market power 
unless one can identify the competitive level and show that the firm’s price 
exceeds it. 
Antitrust has never fully solved this problem. Many scholars have 
argued, as Amex does in this case, that marginal cost (the short–run cost 
                                                                                                         
8 See William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. 
L. REV. 937, 937 (1981); Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
437, 444 (2010).  
9 See Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 119 
(4th ed. 2005).  
10 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
235 (1993) (referring to the ability “to exert market power” by raising “prices above a 
competitive level”); NCAA v. Board of Regents of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 108 n.38 (1984) 
(“Market power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a 
competitive market.”); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 
2013) (Gorsuch, J.) (“To prevail on a section 2 claim, a plaintiff generally must show the 
defendant possessed sufficient market power to raise prices substantially above a 
competitive level without losing so much business that the gambit becomes unprofitable.”).  
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of producing one additional unit) is the competitive level,11 since price 
would equal marginal cost if the market was “perfectly competitive.”12 But 
marginal cost is difficult to calculate and, more importantly, marginal cost 
pricing is infeasible in many industries (e.g., media, prescription drugs, 
and software).13 For example, the marginal cost of downloading one 
additional copy of Windows is essentially zero.14 If Microsoft had to sell 
Windows at marginal cost, it could not afford the research and 
development necessary to create it. Some scholars have therefore argued 
that a better measure of the competitive level is full economic cost (the 
opportunity cost of all inputs, including financial capital), which is 
equivalent to an economic profits test. Yet that measure is even more 
difficult to calculate than marginal cost.15 
Because of these flaws, courts virtually never determine market power 
by calculating the defendant’s marginal cost or full economic cost and 
comparing that figure to its price. Instead, they define a “relevant market” 
and measure the defendant’s share of that market.16 This approach—the 
market definition/market share paradigm—is the presumptive, if not 
obligatory, method of measuring market power in antitrust law.17 In 
theory, it may be skipped if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s 
conduct has caused actual anticompetitive effects.18 But in practice, courts 
                                                                                                         
11 See, e.g., Brief for American Express in Opposition at 40, Ohio v. American Express 
Co., No. 16–1454 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]; Phillip E. 
Areeda, Herbert Hovenkamp & John L. Solow, IIB ANTITRUST LAW 147 (3d ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter AREEDA–HOVENKAMP TREATISE]; Carlton & Perloff, supra note 9, at 119.  
12 F.M. Scherer & David Ross, INDUST. MKT. STRUCTURE AND ECON. PERFORMANCE 20 
(3d ed. 1990).  
13 See Kirkwood, supra note 6, at 18–19.  
14 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
15 See Kirkwood, supra note 6, at 21–25.  
16 See AREEDA–HOVENKAMP TREATISE, supra note 11, at 114 (“Instead of trying to 
measure the degree by which a profit–maximizing monopoly price exceeds the competitive 
price, courts traditionally attempt to infer market power from the defendant(s)’ market 
share.”).  
17 Some decisions indicate that market definition is necessary. See, e.g., Walker Process 
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (“Without a 
definition of [the relevant] market there is no way to measure [defendant’s] ability to lessen 
or destroy competition.”); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 828 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“Defining the market is a necessary step in any analysis of market power . . . .”) (quoting 
U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 994 (11th Cir. 1993)). Other 
decisions state that market definition is the ordinary or first step in determining market 
power. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 935 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“The existence of such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of 
a predominant share of the market.”) (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech Servs. 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 
485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Evaluating market power begins with defining the relevant 
market.”).  
18 See, e.g., American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 168–69.  
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never skip it. No court to my knowledge has ever resolved the market 
power issue without at least a rough market definition. Moreover, 
whenever courts describe the amount of market power required for a 
particular antitrust violation, they always describe it in terms of a 
minimum market share.19 Yet such a heavy reliance on market definition 
is deeply questionable. In many circumstances, market definition is 
complex and uncertain, making the resulting market share finding 
unreliable.20 Some scholars want to do away with market definition 
altogether.21 At oral argument in American Express, Justice Breyer 
referred to it as “one of the most difficult problems in antitrust law.”22 
The approach I propose would avoid these difficulties. In the ordinary 
case, courts would not calculate costs or define a market; they would 
instead focus on the central issue in an antitrust case—the challenged 
conduct. They would find market power if the challenged conduct is likely 
to raise price significantly above the prevailing level or prevent price from 
declining significantly to the but–for level.23 This approach would have 
major benefits for antitrust enforcement, since it would streamline antitrust 
litigation by allowing tribunals to resolve two critical issues—market 
power and anticompetitive effects—at the same time, while inferring the 
relevant market from the result. Courts follow this approach now 
whenever they determine that the challenged conduct has caused actual 
anticompetitive effects. But where the effects of the disputed conduct are 
probable, rather than actual, courts very rarely infer market power from 
those effects. In particular, no court, to my knowledge, has identified the 
but–for level and concluded that the defendant exercised market power 
because its conduct prevented price from falling to that level. In American 
Express, however, the but–for level provides a simple and accurate 
measure of Amex’s market power. 
                                                                                                         
19 See Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. IND. ORG. 
107, 111 (2011) (“All [guidelines, court opinions, legal treatises, or other sources] state 
that there is a market power requirement, and all denominate it in terms of [market 
share].”). 
20 See Kirkwood, supra note 6, at 9–10, 43–45.  
21 See Kaplow, supra note 8, at 440 (“[T]he market definition process should be 
abandoned.”).  
22 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Ohio v. American Express Co., No.16–1454, 
(U.S. Feb. 26, 2018) (adding that “the answer to that [depends] on a lot of different 
circumstances and what you’re up to.”).  
23 If the challenged conduct would substantially raise price or forestall a substantial 
price decline, the court would find monopoly power.  
22 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:17 
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II. MARKET POWER IN AMERICAN EXPRESS 
It is clear that Amex’s anti–steering provisions enabled Amex and the 
other credit card companies to hold merchant fees significantly above the 
but–for level, the level that would exist without those provisions. Had 
merchants been able to steer their customers to credit cards with lower 
merchant fees, then other credit card companies would have had a 
financial incentive to lower their fees and Amex would have faced 
increased pressure to lower its own.24 The result would be significantly 
lower merchant fees and consumer prices.25 In short, the anti–steering 
provisions allowed Amex to exercise market power.  
To be sure, lower fees would make it more difficult for Amex to fund 
its rewards programs. Indeed, Amex contends that its generous incentive 
programs justify the higher merchant fees since the fees directly benefit 
consumers who use its card. But regardless of whether that is a legitimate 
justification, there is no doubt that Amex’s merchant fees are greater than 
they would be without the provisions. That is its goal. Amex’s very 
justification for its anti–steering provisions assumes that higher merchant 
fees will result. 
This fundamental fact—that the NDPs allow Amex to maintain 
elevated merchant fees—is widely recognized. Amex itself acknowledged 
it. In its brief to the Supreme Court, it asserted that its rewards programs 
are “funded by higher merchant fees.”26 Amex also acknowledged that 
without its anti–steering provisions, fees would be lower since “steering 
reflects merchants’ preference for lower fees . . . .”27 Likewise, Amex 
executives testified that if steering was allowed, Amex “would face 
increased pressure to reduce its rates.”28 As a result, the district court found 
that Amex’s restraints have resulted in “higher all–in merchant prices 
across the network services market  . . . .”29 If the restraints were 
abolished, the “restoration of downward competitive pressure on merchant 
prices would . . . result in lower swipe fees charged to merchants by 
American Express and its competitors.”30 Even the Second Circuit, which 
                                                                                                         
24 See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 207 (“[B]y disrupting the price–setting 
mechanism ordinarily present in competitive markets, the NDPs reduce American 
Express’s incentive—as well as those of Visa, MasterCard, and Discover—to offer 
merchants lower discount rates . . . .”).  
25 See id. at 213 (finding that the anti–steering provisions “[i]mpede modes of 
competition that likely would benefit consumers on both sides of the GPCC platform.”).  
26 Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 28.  
27 Id. at 29.  
28 American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 220.  
29 Id. at 215.  
30 Id. at 219; see also id. at 230 (“Without the NDPs in place, . . . ‘Discover would 
aggressively pursue a strategy of lowering [its] prices and providing incentive to merchants 
that would steer incremental volume to Discover.’”) (quoting a Discover executive).  
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thought that Amex’s higher fees were needed to fund its rewards 
programs,31 agreed that its merchant fees were higher as a result of its anti–
steering provisions. These provisions, the court stated, protect “the 
critically important revenue that Amex receives from its relatively high 
merchant fees.”32 
In sum, it is plain that Amex exercised market power. It adopted anti–
steering provisions that crippled price competition between the credit card 
networks, which allowed Amex and its competitors to hold their merchant 
fees above the competitive level—the but–for level. It makes no difference 
to this conclusion that Amex funneled the extra revenues it received from 
its higher merchant fees into its incentive programs. While that diversion 
might justify the higher fees—a questionable proposition discussed 
below—it does not negate the fact that the challenged conduct enabled 
Amex to maintain its merchant fees above the competitive level, the 
essence of market power. 
III. MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET SHARE 
The district court began its analysis of market power by defining a 
relevant market, calculating Amex’s share of that market, and citing a 
factor (“cardholder insistence”) that suggests Amex has more market 
power than its share alone would dictate.33 This is the traditional approach 
to power determination and, as noted earlier, it is often fraught with 
difficulties. The first major issue in American Express was whether the 
relevant market should be limited to the provision of services to merchants 
or also include the other side of this two–sided industry, the provision of 
services to cardholders. The district court limited the market to the 
merchant side and the Second Circuit held that this was a fatal error. The 
relevant market must include both sets of Amex’s customers: cardholders 
and merchants.34 
The appellate court’s reasoning is incorrect. The ultimate issue is 
whether Amex has the power to charge a price above the competitive level. 
If that is true for one set of its customers, it does not matter that it is not 
true for another set. If the benefits Amex furnishes to the second set 
(cardholders) outweigh the harm it imposes on the first set (merchants), 
Amex’s behavior may be legitimate. But that does not negate the 
                                                                                                         
31 See United States v. American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 206 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(“Though merchants may desire lower fees, those fees are necessary to maintain cardholder 
satisfaction . . . .”).  
32 Id. at 205.  
33 See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 170–95.  
34 See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 196–97.  
24 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:17 

conclusion that Amex exercises market power over the first set. In 
addition, as the United States explains in detail, markets are defined by 
goods or services that are reasonable substitutes for each other, and 
cardholder services are not substitutes for merchant services.35 
The second major issue was whether Amex could exercise market 
power when its share of total transaction volume was just 26.4%. Since a 
credit card transaction simultaneously involves both a cardholder and a 
merchant, the parties and the courts thought that 26.4% was a fair measure 
of Amex’s market share regardless of whether the relevant market was 
limited to merchant services or included both merchant services and 
cardholder services. The problem was that courts do not normally regard 
a 26.4% share as sufficient to confer market power.36 In this instance, the 
district court was willing to make an exception because so many of 
Amex’s cardholders insist on using their Amex card. When coupled with 
other factors (high barriers and a concentrated industry), this “cardholder 
insistence” allowed an inference of market power.37 
The Second Circuit rejected this conclusion because cardholder 
insistence is driven by the generosity of Amex’s rewards programs.38 
Without those, Amex’s appeal to both cardholders and merchants would 
dissipate. Because Amex must continue to invest in its rewards programs 
in order to preserve its market share and brand appeal, it cannot exercise 
market power; to the contrary, its ability to charge high merchant fees 
requires that it continuously compete for cardholders.39 
This reasoning, though plausible on the surface, is mistaken. Any firm 
with a distinctive product must invest in maintaining the distinctive 
features of that product in order to preserve its appeal.40 By itself, that 
investment in product quality neither proves nor disproves the existence 
of market power. To resolve that issue, one has to go back to the definition 
of market power—the ability to profitably price above the competitive 
                                                                                                         
35 See Brief of United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 35–40, Ohio v. 
American Express Co., No. 16–1454 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Brief for United 
States].  
36 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 37.  
37 The court also relied on evidence of actual anticompetitive effects. See American 
Express, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 188 (“[Amex’s] ability to impose significant price increases . . .  
without any meaningful merchant attrition.”).  
38 See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 202–03.  
39 See id. at 203 (“That Amex might not enjoy market power without continuing 
investment in cardholder benefits indicates, if anything, a lack of market power.”).  
40 See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 195 (“American Express cannot avert a 
finding of market power premised on cardholder insistence merely because that loyalty and 
its current market share would dissipate if the company were to stop investing in those 
programs that make its product valuable to cardholders. Of course it would, as would the 
share of any company that abandoned a core element of a successful business model.”).  
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level. Amex has market power if it can price profitably above marginal 
cost or, better yet (given the problems with marginal cost), full economic 
cost.41 Accordingly, the question is not whether Amex needs to invest in 
rewards programs or other features of its product to maintain cardholder 
insistence, but whether that investment, and the resulting cardholder 
insistence, gives it the ability to price above marginal cost or full economic 
cost. Unfortunately, none of the parties addressed that issue.42 As a result, 
it is not possible to determine whether Amex’s market share, coupled with 
cardholder insistence, allowed it to price above the competitive level. 
Once again, the traditional tools for evaluating market power come up 
short. It is much easier to decide whether Amex’s exclusionary conduct 
enabled it to maintain merchant fees above the but–for level. 
IV. JUSTIFICATION 
Amex contends that even if its anti–steering provisions allow it to 
exercise market power, the higher merchant fees that result are justified by 
the rewards programs they support. In other words, even if its NDPs 
produce supracompetitive merchant fees, Amex funnels the extra revenue 
into rewards programs for its cardholders, benefiting them and increasing 
non–price rivalry among credit cards. 
This asserted justification faces two initial difficulties and a 
fundamental objection. First, Amex has not poured all the revenue it 
receives from its merchant fees into its rewards programs.43 As a result, 
the losses it imposes on merchants are not fully offset by the benefits it 
provides to cardholders. Second, the higher merchant fees that Amex and 
the rest of the industry charge are passed on to consumers in the form of 
                                                                                                         
41 It makes sense to use cost–based measures of the competitive level here because the 
issue is not whether the challenged conduct gave Amex market power but whether its need 
to invest in product quality shows that it did not possess market power. That is not so. 
Amex would have market power if its investment enabled it to price above cost.  
42 See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 205–06 (“A finding that not every dime of 
merchant fees is passed along to cardholders says nothing about other expenses that Amex 
faces, let alone whether its profit margin is abnormally high . . . . Plaintiffs might have met 
their initial burden under the rule of reason by showing . . . that Amex’s pricing was set 
above competitive levels within the credit–card industry (i.e., supracompetitive pricing). 
At trial, however, they offered no such proof.”).  
43 See id. at 205 (“Indeed, evidence on the record suggests—and Amex conceded at oral 
argument—that not all of Amex’s gains from increased merchant fees are passed along to 
cardholders in the form of rewards.”); see also American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 
216 (“[Plaintiffs’ expert] further concluded that American Express spends less than half of 
the discount fees it collects from merchants on cardholder rewards.”).  
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higher retail prices,44 and many consumers who pay those prices use cash, 
checks, debit cards, or credit cards with few if any rewards.45 These 
consumers are unambiguously hurt by the anti–steering provisions. They 
pay higher prices but receive little or nothing in return. 
The fundamental objection to this asserted justification is that it 
assumes it is acceptable to force one set of customers to pay higher prices 
so long as the revenues are distributed to another set of customers in the 
form of non–price benefits. That is incorrect. A robber who took $100 
from one person cannot excuse the theft because he later gave the $100 to 
another person. The coerced transfer of wealth from the victim to the 
robber is itself the crime. Similarly, a group of competitors cannot agree 
to raise prices to certain consumers and then justify their collusion on the 
ground that they provided an equivalent amount of “rewards” to other 
consumers. Such conduct is also a coerced transfer of wealth, and it 
distorts the competitive process. Instead of letting competition decide 
whether consumers prefer lower prices and lower rewards to higher prices 
and higher rewards, the colluders have made the choice themselves.46 
The only way to justify a restraint that produces higher prices and 
greater non–price benefits, like the anti–steering provisions, is to show that 
the market is subject to a market failure—an imperfection that prevents it 
from maximizing consumer welfare—and that the restraint corrects this 
market failure in the least restrictive way possible and thereby improves 
consumer welfare.47 If that is true, the restraint does not distort the 
competitive process, but rather enhances it. Amex did attempt to show a 
market failure at the trial level. It alleged that some of its merchant services 
and some of its investments in product quality were subject to free–riding, 
an externality that can stunt competition. The district court rejected all of 
Amex’s free–riding theories,48 however, and Amex did not appeal from 
these conclusions. 
                                                                                                         
44 See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 216 (“Merchants facing increased credit 
card acceptance costs will pass most, if not all, of their additional costs along to their 
customers in the form of higher retail prices.”).  
45 See id. (“Higher retail prices affect not only those customers who use American 
Express cards, but also shoppers who instead prefer to pay using a lower–reward GPCC 
card, debit card, check, or cash.”).  
46 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists in Support of Certiorari at 6, Ohio v. 
American Express Co., No. 16–1454 (U.S. Jul. 6 2017) (“Nearly any firm dealing with 
merchants could offer the appellate court’s improper analysis that a restraint that raises the 
firms’ wholesale price to the merchants passes antitrust muster as long as the restraint 
provides the firm with revenue that it spends on enhancing the quality of the products if 
offers to the ‘other side.’”).  
47 If there were no market failure, unrestricted competition would best promote 
consumer welfare.  
48 See American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 234–38.  
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At the Supreme Court, Amex argued that its anti–steering provisions 
were essential to its business strategy. But that hardly justifies them. The 
issue is not what works best for Amex; the issue is what works best for 
consumers. And absent a market failure, a competitive market produces 
the optimal results for consumers; Amex’s restraints would only interfere 
with this process.49 Amex also argued that output—credit card transaction 
volume—has exploded over the last decade, which suggests that 
consumers prefer a market subject to anti–steering provisions. At oral 
argument, Justice Gorsuch emphasized this output increase in his 
aggressive questioning of plaintiffs’ counsel.50 As Chief Justice Roberts 
pointed out, however, Amex had not proved that the output increase was 
caused by its anti–steering provisions, as opposed to more general 
macroeconomic factors like GDP growth or consumer confidence.51 As a 
result, the rise in credit card transaction volume does not establish that the 
NDPs improved overall consumer welfare.52 
CONCLUSION 
Amex convinced the Second Circuit that it does not have market 
power because its leverage over merchants comes from the rewards and 
prestige it provides to its cardholders. Its anti–steering provisions do not 
reduce competition because Amex uses the higher merchant fees they 
generate to fund its rewards programs. In short, its power in the 
marketplace is constrained—indeed, eliminated—by the need to compete 
for cardholders. That view is incorrect. If market power is determined, as 
it ought to be, by the effects of the challenged conduct, then it is clear that 
Amex possesses market power. By its own admission, its anti–steering 
provisions have allowed it to maintain merchant fees significantly above 
the but–for level, the level that unrestricted competition would have 
produced. 
                                                                                                         
49  See Brief for United States, supra note 35, at 45–46 (“Under the Sherman Act, . . .  
the optimal mix of goods and services is set through market competition . . . . As the 
leading treatise explains, the Second Circuit erred in this case by failing to recognize that 
‘under antitrust policy competition should choose the optimal mix of revenue as between 
the two sides’ of Amex’s platform.”).  
50 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Ohio v. American Express Co., (U.S. Feb. 26, 
2017) (No.16–1454) (“[T]here’s no evidence of restricted output in this case, correct?”).  
51 See id. at 41 (“Output of the product has increased, that has so many factors that go 
into that besides the nature of the particular product, right? I mean, if the economy grows, 
then the output of your product, credit card transactions, grows, right?”) (Roberts, C.J.).  
52 See Reply Brief for the United States at 17, Ohio v. American Express Co., No. 16–
1454 (U.S. Feb. 15, 2018) (noting that “transaction volume is influenced by many factors” 
and that transaction volume grew rapidly following Australia’s prohibition of anti–steering 
rules).  
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Amex argues that even if it did impose supracompetitive prices on 
merchants—and thereby exercise market power—its conduct promoted 
rather than reduced competition because it enabled Amex to provide 
generous rewards programs that benefited its cardholders. But absent a 
market failure (and Amex could not establish a significant one at trial), 
higher cardholder rewards cannot justify the exploitation of merchants. 
Any time a defendant, or group of defendants, adopts a restraint that raises 
price to one set of customers, it can funnel the proceeds to another set of 
customers in the form of non–price benefits. But that does not excuse the 
restraint. It forces the first set of customers to pay a supracompetitive price 
and prevents the competitive process from deciding whether customers as 
a whole (or particular sets of customers) would prefer lower prices and 
lower rewards to higher prices and greater rewards. 
